

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1483

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INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0104

NOFORN

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: ANALYSIS OF DEFINITIONS DISCUSSIONS WITH
EASTERN REPS

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FORCE DEFINITIONS
DISCUSSIONS IN VIENNA, INCLUDING KHLESTOV'S BEHAVIOR IN THE MARCH
2 INFORMAL SESSION AND ESPECIALLY IN TWO BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS
OF FORCE DEFINITIONS WITH US REPS ON MARCH 3 AND MARCH 5
(DETAILS IN SEPTELS) SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIETS MAY INTEND (A)
TO ABANDON THE EFFORT TO OBTAIN PRIOR EAST-WEST AGREEMENT ON
WHICH FORCES SHOULD BE COUNTED; (B) INSTEAD TO PUT FORWARD
UNILATERALLY A DETAILED EASTERN RATIONALE OF WHAT FORCES SHOULD
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BE COUNTED; AND THEN AT SOME POINT (C) TO TABLE EASTERN MANPOWER

DATA BASED ON THESE EASTERN COUNTING RULES.

2. IF THIS OCCURS, EASTERN DATA BASED ON ITS OWN COUNTING WILL BE SUBSTANTIALLY LOWER THAN WESTERN DATA TABLED IN 1973. INTER ALIA, EASTERN DATA MAY EXCLUDE REAR ECHELON COMPONENTS OF EAST GERMAN, POLISH, AND CZECHOSLOVAK FORCES FROM THE COUNT, PROVIDE A LOWER TOTAL FOR PACT AIR FORCES THAN WESTERN ESTIMATES, AND LOWER MANNING LEVELS OF SOME PACT FORCES, ESPECIALLY THE SOVIETS. AS REGARDS ALLOCATION TO GROUND AND AIR FORCES, PRESUMABLY, EAST WILL ALLOCATE SSM'S, HELICOPTERS AND GROUND-BASED CZECH AND POLISH AIR DEFENSE AS THEY HAVE LONG PROPOSED. THIS ANALYSIS IS TENTATIVE BECAUSE EVIDENCE IS AS YET FRAGMENTARY. END SUMMARY.

3. IN BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS MARCH 3 AND 5, KHLESTOV DID THE FOLLOWING:

A. WITHOUT MUCH RESISTANCE, HE DROPPED THE EFFORT TO GAIN AGREEMENT ON THREE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF A POSSIBLE FORCE DEFINITION AFTER US REPS MADE CLEAR TO HIM THAT EVEN THE BRIEFEST DEFINITION WOULD HAVE TO SPECIFY CLEARLY INCLUSIONS AND EXCLUSIONS.

B. SECOND, HE WITHDREW THE SOVIET DRAFT DEFINITION TABLED AT DECEMBER 6 BILATERAL WITH US REPS, STATING THAT THE DRAFT WAS VOID BECAUSE NO AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON IT AT THE TIME.

C. THIRD, HE ASSERTED THAT, WHILE RESERVES IN GENERAL SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM A DEFINITION (HE USED THE TERM "MOBILIZATION RESERVES"), THE FRG STANDBY READINESS RESERVE BY STATUTE HAD ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY STATUS. IF THESE PERSONNEL WERE NOT INCLUDED IN NATO'S TOTALS, THEN THE EAST SHOULD BE COMPENSATED BY EXCLUDING FROM ITS TOTALS MANPOWER OF SIMILAR NUMERICAL SIZE.

D. FOURTH, KHLESTOV DEVELOPED A STRONGLY ARGUED CASE THAT NATO EMPLOYED A LARGE NUMBER OF CIVILIANS PERFORMING FUNCTIONS IDENTICAL TO THOSE PERFORMED BY MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE EAST AND THAT THIS FACT TOO WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN DECIDING ON INCLUSIONS AND EXCLUSIONS.

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4. WHILE HE REFRAINED FROM MAKING A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL AS TO THE CONCLUSION TO BE DRAWN FROM HIS ARGUMENT, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE SOVIETS PLAN TO EXCLUDE FROM THE PACT FORCES TO BE COUNTED EASTERN MILITARY PERSONNEL PERFORMING CERTAIN REAR ECHELON FUNCTIONS. THIS IMPRESSION IS STRENGTHENED BY THE GDR REP'S SUGGESTION IN THE MARCH 2 INFORMAL THAT PARTICIPANTS DISCUSS "TERMINOLOGY DIFFICULTIES" AS RELATED TO COMBAT SUPPORT AND SERVICE SUPPORT FORCES, AND BY THE FACT THAT A MILITARY

OFFICER ON THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS PROVIDED A MEMBER OF THE US DELEGATION WITH ITEMIZED LIST OF TYPES OF UNITS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE THREE CATEGORIES OF COMBAT, COMBAT SUPPORT AND SERVICE SUPPORT. IT SEEMS POSSIBLE THAT THIS LIST (TEXT IN SEPTTEL) WILL BE ADVANCED BY SOVIETS IN INFORMALS AS THEIR DESCRIPTION OF WHO SHOULD BE INCLUDED UNDER A DEFINITION.

5. KHLESTOV IS NOW PRESENTING A THEORY ON WHO SHOULD BE INCLUDED AND WHO EXCLUDED IN A FORCE DEFINITION WHICH DIVERGES MARKEDLY FROM THE POSITION HE HAD TAKEN IN THE SOVIET BILATERAL DRAFT OF DEC 6, 1975. THE DEC 6 SOVIET DRAFT DEFINITION, WHICH KHLESTOV HAS NOW WITHDRAWN, EXCLUDED CIVILIANS WORKING FOR THE ARMED FORCES AND INCLUDED HEADQUARTERS AND TRAINING INSTITUTIONS. HEADQUARTERS AND TRAINING PERSONNEL WERE ALSO INCLUDED IN THE WARSAW PACT DEFINITION PRESENTED INFORMALLY AS EARLY AS OCT 14, 1975. BUT THE LATTER ARE NOT INCLUDED ON THE LIST PROVIDED BY SOVIET MILITARY OFFICER.

6. KHLESTOV ALSO ABANDONED EFFORTS TO COME TO AGREEMENT ON A DEFINITION WITH US REPS ON A BILATERAL BASIS. DESPITE HIS EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE TWO BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON FORCE DEFINITIONS WITH US REPS IN THE SINGLE WEEK OF MARCH 1, HE DID NOT SUGGEST A FURTHER BILATERAL ON THE DEFINITION THEME AFTER US REPS HAD REJECTED HIS EFFORTS TO BRING IN THE ISSUE OF CIVILIANS AND HAD STATED THAT AN AGREED DEFINITION WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE IF HE PERSISTED WITH THIS APPROACH.

7. INSTEAD, KHLESTOV TOOK THE UNUSUAL STEP OF PROPOSING THAT AN ADDITIONAL INFORMAL SESSION BE HELD IN THE WEEK OF MARCH 8 ON THE FORCE DEFINITION ISSUE.

8. WE TENTATIVELY CONCLUDE FROM THESE INDICATORS, AS YET FRAGMENTARY, THAT KHLESTOV HAS DROPPED THE IDEA OF GETTING
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EAST-WEST AGREEMENT ON DEFINITION OF FORCES AT THIS STAGE, BUT INTENDS TO PROVIDE THE WEST WITH A FULL EXPLANATION OF AN EASTERN FORCE DEFINITION APPROACH WHICH CONTAINS SIGNIFICANT CHANGES FROM THE POSITION HE PUT DOWN BILATERALLY IN DECEMBER. MOREOVER, KHLESTOV'S INTEREST IN ASSURING THAT HE HAVE AN APPORTUNITY TO PRESENT THIS NEW EASTERN POSITION ON DEFINITIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE IN INFORMAL SESSIONS SUGGESTS THAT HE MAY BE WORKING AGAINST A TIME LIMIT AND THAT HE INTENDS NOT ONLY THE COUNTING RULES WHICH THE EAST WOULD FOLLOW IN PRESENTING DATA, BUT ACTUALLY TO PUT DOWN FIGURES BASED ON THESE RULES, AND POSSIBLY BEFORE THE END OF THE PRESENT ROUND, NOW TENTATIVELY DUE TO END APRIL 9.

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-02 INR-07

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AMEMBASSY BONN

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FROM US REP MBFR

9. THE IMPRESSION THAT THE EAST INTENDS TO PUT DOWN ITS DATA AS WELL AS A NEW DEFINITION IS REINFORCED BY CONTINUED EASTERN INTEREST IN THE FORCE DEFINITION ISSUE AS SUCH AND BY HEAVY DATA DEPENDENCY OF THE EASTERN REDUCTION PROPOSAL OF FEBRUARY 17. FURTHER EVIDENCE IS THE FACT THAT KHLESTOV HAS INFORMED US REP THAT WESTERN ESTIMATES OF PACT AIR MANPOWER WERE TOO HIGH (DETAILS IN MBFR VIENNA 0086). ON THE MARGIN OF RECENT INFORMALS, KHLESTOV HAS ALSO INDICATED INTEREST IN WESTERN ESTIMATES OF MANNING LEVELS OF PACT FORCES. HIS REMARKS ON THIS TOPIC WERE FRAGMENTARY AND AMBIGUOUS, BUT IT IS A DATA-CONNECTED SUBJECT WHICH HE HAS NOT RAISED BEFORE.

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10. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND OF PREVIOUS EASTERN COMMENTS ON DATA, THESE DEVELOPMENTS SUGGEST THAT, IF AND WHEN THE PACT DOES TABLE DATA, ITS FIGURES WILL BE SUBSTANTIALLY LOWER THAN WESTERN ESTIMATES OF PACT AND SOVIET MANPOWER. MORE SPECIFICALLY, EASTERN DATA MAY EXCLUDE: (A) A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF EASTERN REAR ECHELON PERSONNEL ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY PERFORM FUNCTIONS WHICH IN THE WEST ARE PERFORMED BY CIVILIANS. (B) BE LOWER THAN THE WEST ON TOTAL AIR FORCE MANPOWER; AND (C) BE LOWER THAN THE WEST ON SOVIET MANPOWER AND POSSIBLY OTHER PACT MANPOWER. ON THE LAST POINT, THE EAST MAY ALLEGE LOWER MANNING LEVELS THAN THE WEST HAS ASSIGNED TO EASTERN FORCES. IT IS NOT CLEAR AT THE PRESENT STAGE WHAT PRACTICAL CONCLUSION THE SOVIETS WILL ATTEMPT TO DRAW FROM THEIR CONTENTION THAT IF THE GERMAN STANDBY RESERVE IS NOT TO BE COUNTED IN THE WESTERN FORCES, ITS EXCLUSION MUST BE COMPENSATED BY A COMPARABLE EXCLUSION FROM PACT FORCES.

11. WE WILL FORWARD FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THESE ASPECTS. IN THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE NEXT WEEKS, WE WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN THE PRESENT WESTERN POSITION ON DEFINITIONS WITHOUT CHANGE, AND WILL CONTINUE TO REJECT THE NEW EASTERN APPROACH TO INCLUSIONS AND EXCLUSIONS AS WELL AS SOVIET EFFORTS TO GAIN WESTERN AGREEMENT TO ANY REALLOCATION PRIOR TO EXCHANGE OF DATA.

12. THE UNDERLYING SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE SOVIET MOVES SHOULD NOT BE LOST FROM SIGHT DESPITE THE NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF POSSIBLE FUTURE EASTERN ACTIONS AS REGARDS FORCE TOTALS. THE SOVIETS ARE NOW ADVANCING DEFINITIONAL CONCEPTS WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF DECREASING THE DISPARITY WHICH NATO CLAIMS EXISTS. THESE ACTIONS SHOW THAT THE EAST RECOGNIZES THAT, BASED ON A FORCE DEFINITION ALONG WESTERN LINES, THE EAST'S OWN DATA WOULD SHOW A CONSIDERABLE DISPARITY. THUS, THEY ALSO SHOW THAT THE EAST IS TAKING SERIOUSLY NATO'S REFUSAL TO CONTRACTUALIZE DISPARITIES AND NATO'S DEMAND THAT OUTCOME BE PARITY IN MANPOWER AND IS MOVING TO TRY TO DEAL WITH THESE REQUIREMENTS IN ITS OWN WAY. WHILE THE EAST WILL PROBABLY START OUT BY CLAIMING THAT ITS DATA JUSTIFY ITS PROGRAM OF EQUAL PERCENTAGE

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REDUCTIONS, THESE DEVELOPMENTS SHOULD ULTIMATELY PLACE THE WEST IN A POSITION TO MAKE USE OF THE EASTERN MOVE ONTO THE TERRAIN OF THE WESTERN POSITION ON PARITY WHILE CONTESTING THE INDIVIDUAL MOVES THE EAST MAY ADVANCE IN

THE EFFORT TO MAKE THE DISPARITY MANAGEABLE FOR IT.

13. IF OUR ANALYSIS IS CORRECT, THE SOVIETS ALSO APPEAR
TO CONTEMPLATE A SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE FROM THEIR PREVIOUS
GENERAL REFUSAL TO REVEAL MILITARY INFORMATION AND TO
PROVIDE DATA ON EASTERN FORCES IN EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS
ON ARMS CONTROL. EVEN THOUGH THEIR OBJECTIVE IN DOING SO
IN VIENNA WOULD BE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE MANPOWER DISPARITY
IS FAR LESS THAN NATO CONTENDS, SUCH A DEPARTURE WOULD
BE SIGNIFICANT. RESOR

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